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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EARL W. SADLEIR, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- Case No. 837 4 
1\iELVIN G. KNAPTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PETITION OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
FOR REHEARING 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND 
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH: 
The defendant and appellant above named respect-
fully petitions this Court for a rehe.aring on its opinion 
issued in the above entitled cause on the 16th day of April, 
1956. This petition is based upon the following grounds: 
1. The record warrants a more precise st.atement 
of the facts. 
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2. A fraud upon the Court should not be condoned. 
3. The decision ignores the clear meaning of the I \it 
Statute. 
The attorneys for the defendant and appellant here-
by certify that this petition for rehearing is made in good 
faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS, 
MATTSSON & EVANS 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
ARGUJ\!IENT 
It is recognized by the decision that the above case 
is one of first impression with this Court on the con-
struction of the controlling Statute, Section 30-3-9, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. We believe it significant that the 
jury's verdict was six to two and that the decision of 
this Court is three to two. The thin line between what 
is right and what is wrong, both on the fact and on the 
law, warrants, we believe, a closer scrutiny of the record 
and of the law. The Iowa case of Hamilton v. McNeill, 
150 Iowa 470, 129 N.W. 480, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 604, covers 
practically every phase of this kind of litigation, includ-
ing legislative intent. Certainly some of the language 
of the Iowa Court merits specific rejection or approval. 
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POINT I. 
THE RECORD WARRANTS A MORE PRECISE STATE-
MENT OF THE FACTS. 
The opinion states that in Decen1ber of 1953 plain-
tiff's wife revealed to him. that she \Vas "moody" for de-
fendant. It is respectfully submitted that the record does 
not support the statement. Sadleir testified that his wife 
"was a little mopy at times, but, then, that was the same 
as she always had been." (R. 26). And th.at between 
Christmas and the 8th of January, 1954, his wife "got 
real moody there for a little while." (R. 27). But there 
is no direct statement in the record that plaintiff's wife 
"revealed to him that she was 'moody' for defendant." 
As a matter of fact Sadleir does not purport to quote 
his former wife on any feeling that she might have had 
for the defendant and the record is silent in that regard. 
From the testimony of I\frs. Sadleir in the divorce pro-
ceedings it appears that there were no affections to 
alienate. 
The opinion turns a unilateral statement of defen-
dant into an agreement to support plaintiff's former wife 
until she could obtain a diverce and to pay for the divorce 
and then to marry her when the divorce was final. 
Nowhere in the record is it shown that anyone agreed 
to anything. It w.as a conversation between the two n1en. 
The inference that Knapton supported the plaintiff's wife 
or paid for the divorce is not supported by the record, 
nor is the statement: "Thereupon 1\Irs. Sadleir left plain-
tiff's home and discontinued living with him, taking the 
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children with her, and immediately thereafter conunenced 
divorce proceedings." (Emphasis added). Sadleir's testi- :n 
mony, the only testimony on this point, is that Mrs. ~· ~ 
Sadleir took the children to Mr. Sadleir's mother's home !h 
to tell her that she was leaving; that Sadleir in turn went 
to his mother's place and then took Mrs. Sadleir, ~Irs. 
Sadleir's sister and the children to the latter's home a 
couple of blocks away, and that the next morning Mrs. 
Sadleir's parents came in from Wendover "and she went 
out there for a week or so with them." (R. 31). It is 
reasonable to suppose that l\1rs. Sadleir counseled with 
her parents and that they intervened, but, in any event, 
it cannot be said that the divorce action followed im-
mediately upon the heels of the conversation between the 
two men. 
A stranger to the record would read from the opinion 
a factual setting by far more prejudicial to the defendant 
than is justified. In a case where the expression "illict 
suitor" is coined, it is respectfully submitted that the 
record should be strictly adhered to and that circum-
stances, conduct and unilateral expression should not be 
placed in an unfair light. 
POINT II. 
A FRAUD UPON THE COURT SHOULD NOT BE CON-
DONED. 
Mr. Justice Henriod, in his dissenting opinion, uses 
strong language relative to the conduct of S.adleir and 
states that he has been "found guilty of bamboozling and 
perpetrating a fraud upon the court, concealing facts 
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5 
and then conveniently producing what he contends are 
true, but unfound facts." The dissenting opinion charges 
the main opinion with having condoned "a deliber.ate 
fraud upon a divorce court." In these expressions we 
most emphatically concur, but for the benefit of the Bench 
and Bar we earnestly submit that more of the record 
should be revealed so as to disclose the fraud actually 
practiced upon the divorce court. 
Sadleir was represented by counsel in the divorce 
case .and permitted his default to be entered. He was 
"legally told to be quiet" during the proceedings (R. 
36). Sadleir heard his wife testify and criticize the 
marriage and heard her say "His folks have been in 
on everything we did, everything we bought; we had to 
get their approval on practically everything we did." (R. 
37). He heard her testify that she h.ad requested him 
"on numerous occasions during the marriage to seek 
another residence" away from his parents, and that she 
was fearful in the interests of the children (R. 38). Sad-
lier heard his wife testify that "he doesn't seem to be 
much of a man to get out on his own .and try and make 
us a living and a home." And she answered "Yes" to 
the question: "And, as a result, Mrs. Sadleir, have ;'on 
lost all respect for your husband~" (R. 39-40). All this 
was without protest from Sadleir in the forum where it 
was his duty to speak if he denied the fact. The trial 
judge unwittingly bec.ame a part and parcel to the suit 
for alienation of affections which followed the divorce 
decree by thirty days. 
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Mr. Justice Crockett states in his opinion: "It would 
be very unusual, if not inconceivable, that a husband 
would sue for alienation of affections while still married 
to his wife." The fact of the divorce was injected into 
the instant case by plaintiff's testimony on direct ex-
amination (R. 31). Undoubtedly it was recognized as 
part of plaintiff's prima facie case. If his testimony is 
true in the instant case, then the divorce court was led 
into error by plaintiff's silence. 
Sadleir's mother and Sadleir's brother were in the 
divorce court .at the time of Mrs. Sadleir's divorce as 
onlookers (R. 70). Sadleir's parents, as the testimony 
in the divorce proceeding discloses, had been "in on every-
thing we did, everything we bought, we had to get their 
approval on practically everything we did. vVhere we 
went they went. We very seldon1 went on a trip or any-
where where we went by ourselves." (P. 4 Ex. 2-P). 
Plaintiff's home was straight across the street from that 
of his parents, and on nu1nerous occasions Mrs. Sadleir 
asked her husband to seek another residence. As a result 
of Sadleir's conduct his wife lost all respect for him. 
(P. 4 Ex. 2-P). 
True to form the Sadleir family took their seats in 
the arena, the arena where one of the members of. this 
Court states that a fraud on the trial court occurred. But 
we ask: Why not set those facts out at least as a warn-
ing to others that some day a majority court might recog-
nize such conduct as constituting a fraud upon the court~ 
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ltwomij In the instant matter one's idea of the integrity of 
nuso~ judicial proceedings cannot help but be jolted. In fair-
marn&J ness to the litigants and to the case as a precedent we 
tedin!ij respectfully submit that the presence of Sadleir in the 
rect ~~. divorce court and his attitude concerning the proceed-
rizeu ~ ings, coming from his own lips as a witness in the aliena-
mon!~ tion case, w.arrants specific reference. 
wa1lw 
l!llll· 
) 
, .. ·1 
:arn· 
art! 
POINT III. 
THE DECISION IGNORES THE CLEAR MEANING OF 
THE STATUTE. 
The decision as written by :Mr. Justice Wade ex-
pressly recognizes that the right against alienation could 
not exist if there had been no marriage, but ipse dixit 
states that the plaintiff's right is not "acquired by marri-
age." l\{r. Justice Crockett .asserts the "illicit suitor" 
analogy and then goes on to say: "It seems to me un-
questionable that it (the statute) is to be considered in 
context with the other statutes in the title on Husband 
and Wife and that it relates solely to their rights inter 
se." (Emphasis ours). The fallacy of both statements 
is most ably pointed out by Mr. Justice Henriod and 
concurred in by Mr. Justice Worthen. 
If the doctrine of stare decisis has any place what-
soever in our philosophy, it seems to us appropriate that 
the issue be raised whenever a court would seem to 
indicate an .attitude of disdain for the Legislative intent 
and for judicial precedents as well. 
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In Hamilton v. McNeill, supra, it is said: 
"We think it must be said that plaintiff's 
right, if any, to maintain this action, is neces-
sarily a right 'acquired by the marriage.' The 
cause of action is one which could arise only out 
of and by virtue of the marriage relation. On 
the face of the statute, therefore, the plaintiff, 
having been adjudged in the divorce decree to 
be the guilty party, forfeited 'all rights acquired 
by the marriage.' Levins v. Sleator, 2 G. Greene, 
604; Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; Maynard v. 
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654; 
Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N. E. 890, 4 
L.R.A. (N.S.) 643, 114 Am. St. Rep. 605." 
Furthermore, the Iowa court points out that the forfei-
ture which the legislature deemed to be in the public in-
terest could not be avoided by a showing that such for-
feiture would operate to the benefit "in a negative sense 
of an undeserving person." This reasoning we point to 
upon well documented authority as dissipating the illu-
sory "illicit suitor" expression of ~fr. Justice Crockett. 
We deem it not to lie in the mouth of any Judge or any 
Court to question the propriety of a clear and unequivocal 
expression of the legislature, except upon basic principles 
of constitutionality. The expression of public policy is 
voiced in the instant matter by the legislature and, as 
1fr. Justice Henriod points out, by the legislatures of 
fourteen states, including Colorado, Nevada and Wyom-
ing. It is not enough to say that this is not the "kind of 
a right" which the statute contemplates. A mere as-
sertion of the Judge or Court should not prevail over 
the plain language of the statute. 
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Mr. Justice Crockett goes further and says that the 
statute must be considered "in context" with the other 
statutes in the title on Husband and 'Vife and that it 
relates "solely to their rights inter se." Does the Learned 
Judge mean that divorce and all of its consequences, 
and of marriage and its relationship, are related "solely 
to" the man and the woman~ If so, there has been dis-
carded the entire concept of marriage and divorce. We 
have been given to believe from the writings of the past 
that the State legislates as to both marriage and divorce 
in the public interest and that the relation of husband 
and wife, while formed by contract, derives both its rights 
and duties from a source higher than any contract of 
which the parties are capable. 
The parties cannot contract marriage in this State 
without the sanction of the State, nor can they amend, 
modify, restrict, enlarge or release without similar sanc-
tion. "It is an institution, in the maintenance of which 
in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is 
the foundation of the family and of society, without which 
there would be neither civilization nor progress." Fur-
thermore: "We are not at liberty to inquire into the 
wisdom of our existing law on this subject, nor into the 
expediency of such frequent interference by the Legisla-
ture. We can only inquire into the constitutionality of 
the Act under consideration." The quotations in this 
paragraph, as well as the philosophy of marriage and 
divorce under Legislative edict, are found in JJJaynard 
v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654, cited 
by the Iowa court in Hamilton v. McNeill, supra. 
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A rehearing in this case should be granted if for no 
other reason than to emasculate the reference to the 
Court's "illicit suitor" and the concept that the statutes 
under the title Husband and ·wife relate "solely to their 
rights inter se." 
CONCLUSION 
The op1n1on as it now stands charts a course for 
those who would conspire to prey upon human emotions. 
We are more impressed with the blue print that the 
malingering litigant can follow than with the "illicit 
suitor" hypothesis. It is significant that before the case 
of Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P. 2d 759, suits 
for alienation of affections were practically unheard of 
in this State. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that 
several such actions now pend in our District Court~. 
The fact that fourteen States, particularly neighboring 
States, abandon this type of litigation is significant as 
an expression of public policy. The Iowa Court tells us 
that Utah has relegated this type of litigation to the 
ash heap .as far back as 1852. The dearth of such ac-
tions prior to the Oldroyd case would seem to us to mean 
that others have interpreted Section 30-3-9 as we have. 
The Oldroyd case did not have the "guilty party" element, 
nor was there such a plain fraud practiced upon the 
divorce court. 
In the interest of rationaliz.ation a rehearing should 
be granted where this Court will have the opportunity 
to take exception to the reasoning of the Iowa Court in 
a manner that will impress the reader with the logic of 
I 
l 
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statutory interpretation. A rehearing should be had on 
both the fact and the law. In .a case of first impression 
it should be pointed out the purpose, if any, served by 
Section 30-3-9. This State, as in Iowa, has other statu. 
tory provisions on questions of alimony, the custody of 
children, the termination of property rights vested and 
inchoate in the event of divorce. Our "guilty party" 
statute must serve some purpose and, unless it is given 
effect under the circumstances of the instant matter, it 
would appear that this Court holds that the statute has 
no purpose. A rehearing should be granted to point out 
the purpose and effect of the statute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS, 
MATTSSON & EVANS 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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